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In the Suprente Court 
of the State of Utah 
In the Matter of the Estate of ) 
ROBERT L. PROUDFIT, 
Deceased. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7405 
This is an appeal from an order fixing the Utah 
Inheritance Tax in the above entitled estate and direct-
ing payment thereof (R. 40-43). There is no substantial 
controversy as to the facts the argument being as to the 
legal effect thereof. 
Robert L. Proudfit died testate, a resident of Weber 
County, State of Utah, on the 14th day of May, 1948. 
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His will was duly admitted to probate and Jeanette R. 
Proudfit, who was named executrix under the will, quali-
fied and was appointed as executrix (R. 5, 6 and 10). 
Robert L. Proudfit left an estate consisting of per-
sonal and real property. The real property is located 
in Weber County, State of Utah, and consists of three 
lots improved with eight small single dwelling houses 
and one small duplex dwelling house (R. 0-3). The per-
sonal property consists of shares of stock, cash on de-
posit in banks, and miscellaneous items of personal 
property consisting of electric stoves, refrigerators, and 
other miscellaneous items (R. 0-3). All of the real and 
personal property after the payment of funeral expenseg, 
debts and other liabilities of the deceased ·was devised 
to Jeannette R. Proudfit, vvho is the executrix herei11. 
(R. 7, 8, 11, and 12). For inheritance tax purposes the 
gross estate of the decedent was appraised at the sum 
of $220,711.58 (R. 18-20). 
The executrix filed an inheritance tax return anrl in 
such return claimed certain deductions which the court 
allO\ved in its order fixing the Utah inheritance tax and 
directing payment thereof. It is the contention of the 
appellant herein that the court erred in allowing thl• 
. following deductions shown on the inheritance tax re-
turn ( R. 36 and 37). Those deductions are : 
1. $247.75 for garden labor, maintaining and pre-
serving real estate. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
2. $280.00 for labor and management services on 
rented real estate. 
3. $33.35 for repars to preserve heating system in 
rented real estate. 
4. $1,056.17 for heating costs and discharging 
decedent's obligation as landlord of rented 
real estate. 
5. $882.52 for general repairs necessary to main-
tain and preserve real estate and discharge de-
cedent's obligation. 
6. $59.90 for electric power and repairs on stoves 
and refrigerators on rented property, in com-
pliance of obligation by decedent as landlord. 
7. $133.15 for water charges incident to main-
tenance and preserving real estate and serv-
ing tenants of real property. · 
8. $188.92 for insurance premiums on real estate 
improvements and furnishings. 
These expenses were incurred after the death of 
the decedent and during the administration of the estate, 
which required a year and a few weeks, in the operation 
of ten rental units, those units being the real property 
heretofore referred to (R. 48 and 49). It does not ap-
pear from the record that these expenditures were ex-
pressly approved by the probate court prior to the time 
when they were incurred. 
The evidence taken at the hearing on the order to 
determine the amount of the l'tah inheritance tax \Ya~ 
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to the effect that these rental units had been managed 
for a period of ten years prior to the death of the dece-
dent by Robert L. Proudfit, Jr., a son of the decedent, 
and that since the death of the decedent, Robert L. Proud-
fit, Jr., has continued to manage these rental un'its for 
the executrix (R. 50 and 51). At the time of the dece-
dent's death all ten rental units were rented and for all 
practical purposes had been rented during the entire 
administration of the estate (R. 51). These ten units 
are located on the three lots of real property, which lots 
are all adjacent to one another thereby making one lot, 
and are arranged about a court, commonly known as 
Custer Place or Custer Court. There are lawns and 
gardens about the premises and a central heating sys-
tem which heats all ten units. The court is operated ill 
much the same manner as an apartment house, eYen 
though they are separate houses, and many of the same 
services as are ordinarily furnished to tenants of au 
apartment house, are furnished. The lawns and gar-
dens about the court were maintained by the decedent 
as landlord. All ten units were heated from a centr<1l 
heating system and the cost of furnishing heat has been 
assumed by the decedent as landlord. The decedent as 
landlord maintained the houses inside and out, cleanin~ 
the premises at regular intervals, papering, painting 
and making repairs to the premises as were necessan· 
from time to time. The decedent as landlord furnished 
electric stoves and refrigerators, replacing or repairing 
them when necessary. The water used by the tenant:~ 
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7 
was furnished by the decedent. The decedent kept the 
real estate and the improvements thereon insured (R. 
51-53). 
The deductions which are in dispute herein are the 
costs of furnishing these various services. The rental 
units were operated in the same manner during the ad-
ministration of the estate as they had been operated for 
the last ten years. No services were furnished during 
the administration of the estate that it had not been the 
custom of the decedent to furnish prior to his death (R. 
54-56). There was nothing unusual about the expenses 
incurred during administration of the estate as com-
pared with the expenses which arose in the operation 
of these units prior to the death of the decedent. The 
expenses of furnishing the above services were taken 
into account in determining the amount of rents to be 
charged on the various units and it does not appear 
from the evidence that the rents received during the 
administration were not sufficient to pay the cost of 
furnishing these services (R. 53, 54 and 55). Nine of 
the units rented for $48.75 per month and one unit rented 
for $42.50 per month, making a total of $481.25 per 
month, or $5,775.00 per year (R. 58). 
The amounts received as rentals during the admin-
i~tration of the estate have not bePn included as an asset 
of the estate in the inheritance tax return (R. 35-38). 
Nor were thPy included in the gross appraised value of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
the estate by the appraisers in determining the value of 
real estate at the time of the decedent's death, except that 
the appraisers may have considered the rental value of 
the property at the time of decedent's death in making 
their appraisement (R. 18-20). 
The rental units were listed with the Office of Price 
Administration of the Federal Government and subject 
to the rent control act. At the time the units were regis-
tered with the Office of Rent Control the services which 
were being furnished by the landlord or decedent, which 
are the same as were furnished during the administra-
tion of the estate, and which are the same for which de-
ductions are now claimed, were declared and were pre-
sumably taken into account by the Office of Rent Control 
in arriving at the amount of rent to be charged for eac<1 
rental unit (R. 57). 
It is further stipulated between counsel for all par-
ties concerned that it has been the practice of the Stat' 
Tax Commission of the State of Utah for at least the 
last four years to disallow the kind of deductions that 
is claimed and in dispute in this estate (R. 59). 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPOX 
The appellant, the State Tax Commission, relies on 
the following errors for a reversal of the order appealed 
from: 
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1. 
The court erred in its conclusions of law that the 
following sums paid by the executrix for the purposes 
hereinafter stated were lawful deductions in determin-
ing the net estate of the decedent for inheritance tax 
purposes and that Utah inheritance tax should be com-
puted without allowances of such claimed deductions : 
1. $247.75 for garden labor, maintaining and pre-
serving real estate. 
2. $280.00 for labor and management services on 
rented real estate. 
3. $33.35 for repairs to preserve heating system 
in rented real estate. 
4. $1,056.17 for heating costs and discharging de-
cedent's obligation as landlord of rented real 
estate. 
5. $882.52 for general repairs necessary to main-
tain and preserve real estate and discharge 
decedent's obligation. 
6. $59.90 for electric power and repairs on stoves 
and refrigerators on rented property, in conl-
pliance of obligation by decedent as landlord. 
7. $133.15 for water charges incident to mainten-
ance and preserving real estate and serving 
tenants of real property. 
8. $188.92 for insurance premiums on real estate 
improvements and furnishings. 
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10 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
The primary question which is before the court for 
decision is whether the trial court erred in holding that 
all deductions claimed by the executrix are just and 
proper deductions. 
As we view it the decision in the case depends upon 
the answer to the following questions: 
(1) Were the deductions set forth 1n the State-
ment of Errors necessarily incurred in the preservatio11 
of the estate and, therefore, deductible as a cost or ex-
pense of administration~ 
(2) Should the expenses claimed be taken out of 
rental income produced by reason of such expenditure~! 
(3) Are the claimed deductions debts owing by 
the decedent at the time of his death~ 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Were the d·eductions set forth in the Statement of 
Errors necessarily incurred in the preservation of the 
estate and, therefore, deductible as a cost or expense of 
administration? 
The problem presented in this portion of the argu-
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ment depends upon the construction to be placed upon 
that portion of 80-12-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
which reads as follows: 
'' * • • the costs and expenses of administra-
tion * * *" 
Admittedly an expense incurred in the preservation 
of a decedent's estate is a cost of administration and the 
representative of an estate incurring such expen::;e 
should be allowed to deduct such expense for the pur-
pose of determining the net estate of the decedent for 
inheritance tax purposes, but the representative of the 
estate has the burden of showing that the expenses wer3 
necessarily incurred in good faith for the preservation 
of the real property and not for some other purpose. 
It is submitted that the court in construing 80-12-8 
U. C. A. 1943, should consider the construction placed 
upon such statute by the Tax Commission. 
It is stipulated by counsel representing the parties 
herein that it has been the practice of the Tax Commi~­
sion for a period of at least four years, to disallow the 
deductions which are claimed and disputed in this 
estate (R. 59). There is no further evidence in the 
record with regard to how long such interpretation has 
bern placed upon thP. statute. Ho·wever, it is submitted 
that in no case has the Commission allowed this type of 
deduction in computing the net estate of a decedent fo1· 
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inheritance tax purposes. Admittedly a misinterpreta-
tion of a statute gives no regularity to such interpreta-
tion. However, the Supreme Court of Utah, in the case 
of Board of State Land Comntissioners v. Ririe, 56 Utah 
213, 190 Pac. 59, said: 
"While it is true that the construction of a 
statute by the executive department is not bind-
ing upon the courts, it is, nevertheless, also true, 
and is so determined by the overwhelming weight 
of authority, that unless such construction does 
violence to the apparent intent of the language 
used it is entitled to serious consideration by the 
courts, and especially so if the statute has been 
in force for any great length of time and has 
been so construed.'' 
This statement of the law \\·as acquiesced in by thi~ 
court in In re Cowan's Estate, (1940) 98 U. 393, 99 Pa•·. 
2d 605, and was reaffirmed in the case of Utalt Concrete 
Products Co. 1-'- State Tax Commission (1942), 101 U. 
513, 1:23 Pac. 2d 408, and E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Ta.r 
Commission, 168 Pac. 2d 33:2. 
The interpretation of the Commission as to what 
constitutes "costs of administration" is a pracLeal 
interpretation of the statute and certainly does no ,·io-
lence to an~r apparent intent of the language u~Pd. \V\·, 
therefore, submit that such interpn•tatjon is entitled t,) 
serious consideration by this court. 
Tlw State Tax Commission has no publislw<l regu-
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13 
lations setting forth its interpretation of our inheritance 
tax law. HoweYer, it is guided, wherever possible, by 
regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 
~-\ clear definition of administratiYe expenses is 
found in Regulation 105 relating to estate tax under the 
Internal Revenue Code of the Federal Government, Sec-
tion 81-32 as follows : 
''The amounts deductible from the gross 
estate as 'administrative expenses' are such ex-
penses as are actually and necessarily incurred 
in the administration of the estate; that is, in the 
collection of the assets, payment of debts, and 
distribution among the persons entitled. The 
expenses contemplated by law are such only a8 
attend the settlement of an estate by the legal 
representative preliminary to the transfer of the 
property to the individual beneficiaries or to a 
trustee, whether such trustee is an executor or 
some other person. Expenditures not essential to 
the proper settlement of the estate, but incurred 
for the individual benefit of the heirs, legatees, 
or devisees, may not be taken as deductions. Ad-
ministration expenses include (1) executor's com-
mission, (2) attorney fees, and (3) miscellaneous 
expenses." (italics ours) 
i\liscellaneous expenses are defined by Section 81-33 
of the same regulation as: 
''This includes such expenses as court cost;;;, 
surrogate's fees, accountants fees, appraisers fees, 
clerk hiring, etc. Expenses necessarily incurred 
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in preserving and distributing the estate are de-
ductible including the cost of storing or main-
taining property of the estate, if it is impossible 
to effect immediate distribution to the beneficiar-
ies. Expenses for preserving and care for prop-
erty may not include outlays for additions or im-
provements; nor will such expenses be allowed 
for a longer period than the executor is required 
to retain the property. A brokerage fee for sell--
ing property of the estate is deductible if the sale 
is necessary in order to pay the decedent's debts, 
the expenses of administration or to effect distr:.-
bution. Other expenses accompanying the sale 
are deductible such as the fees of an auctionee~· 
if it is reasonably necessary to employ one.'' 
(italics ours) 
''Generally speaking, the expenses of adminis-
tering a decedent's estate are to be deducted from 
the gross value of the estate jn arriving at it~ 
clear or net value for inheritance tax purposes: 
but the rule does not extend to e:xeessive expens(•...;, 
nor does it necessarily apply to PYery expenditure 
by an executor or administrator, even though tl1~> 
expenditure in question is a proper and lcgitillmt•.' 
one, allowable as a disbursement on the final set-
tlement of the estate ... " 61 C .• J., Section 259:2, 
Page 1704. . 
''An executor or administrator, in the absence 
of a statute or will conferring upon him posses-
sion or management of the real estate, is under 
no duty to make repairs or improvements. \Yhere, 
however, under the local administration laws po:-~­
session of the realty is vested in a personalrt>pre-
sentatiYe, he should preserve the value of the real 
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estate by making necessary repairs. This does 
not, in general, mean that he may expend money 
in the erection of a new building, but merely that 
he may expend it in repairs to the extent neces-
sary to preserve the property. In other words, he 
can properly make expenditures for necessary 
repairs only ... " 21 Am. Jur., Executors and 
Administrators, Section 294, Page 547. 
In discussing Section 7718, Compiled Laws of Utah 
1907 which provided among other things that an admin-
istrator ''must keep in good tenantable repair all houses, 
buildings and fixtures" on real estate under his control 
and in discussing Section 7739 which provides "he shall 
be allowed all necessary expenses in the care, manage-
ment and settlement of the estate", the Supreme Court 
of Utah in the case of In re Hansen's Estate, 55 Utah 
23, had this to say on page 41: 
''The question of the allowance for improve-
ments must be determined from the facts in each 
particular case, bearing in mind that such im-
provements must be proven to have been reason-
ably necessary and made in good faith for the 
benefit of the estate.'' 
In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Utah, 
September 28, 1945, In re Smith's Estate, Davies ""· 
Rmith, et al, 162 Pacific 2d 105, the facts are as follows: 
Elias ~I. Smith died October 22, 1937, leaYing an estate 
consisting principally of two farms "Thich "Tere located 
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about 165 miles west of Fillmore, Utah. By the terms 
of the will \Villiam B. Davies, son-in-law to the deceased, 
was named to act as executor without bond. He was 
directed to: "rent or operate my main ranch at Garri-
son, Utah, (at present consisting of 160 acres) and seil 
the estate's share of the crop after retaining enough for 
feed and seed and after paying taxes, insurance, and 
other essentional expenses of the ranch (including taxes, 
and insurance on my present home or house and four 
acres) shall turn over to my wife, Mary H. Smith, these 
net proceeds of the ranch for her own personal needs.'' 
''The executor in his individual capacity owned 
a ranch in the immediate vicinity of the estate 
farms. He operated, with his brother, a large 
number of cattle and had some grazing permits 
on public domain. His operation of the estate 
lands was closely allied with the operation of his 
own lands. He, without court approval, leased 
the estate's farm to himself in 1938, 1939, and 
1940. During other years he personally purchased 
the produce from the estate's farm. He purchased 
lun1ber for the purpose of building feed racks on 
the estate's farm and then used those racks in 
the feeding of his own livestock. "\Vhen the farm 
was leased to third persons he failed to get ap-
proval of the lease. Men hired to work on the 
estate's farm were also, during substantially the 
same period, employed by him to work on his own 
lands ... The record does not show that the execu-
tor was guilty of overreaching in his dealings 
with the estate, but it does show that he thor-
oughly mixed his own personal business with that 
of the estate.'' 
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"\Yhen the executor filed his account with the court 
certain expendtiures were questioned. Among others 
were $9.68 for 48 fence posts for the upkeep of tht=J 
premises and $14.00 to Chester Hornbeck for wire foe 
the premises. The district court disallowed these items · 
and the Supreme Court refused to change the ruling, 
quoting the case of In re Hansen's Estate (previously 
cited), holding that since he failed to get approval from 
the court for the capital improvements, the burden 
should be on him to show that they were for the benefit 
of the estate. (Which he had not done.) 
Thus it will be seen that in order for an item to be 
deductible as an administrative expense upon the theory 
that the expense was incurred for the preservation of 
thr assets of the estate, the person claiming the deduc-
tion must bear the burden of showing that the expense~ 
W(·re incurred for the qenefit of the estate and not the 
heirs, legatees or devisees, and the expenses must be 
prm·en to have been necessary and made in good faith 
for the benefit of the estate. In this case there is abso-
lutely no proof that the expenses incurred ·were nece~.:;­
~nr~·. In fact, it affirmatively appears that some 
charges, such as the charge of maintaining the tempera-
ture in the rental units at 72°, were not such items as 
would be necessarily incurred in the preservation of an 
estate and could not under any circumstances have bene-
fitrd the estate. :Moreover, we must keep in mind that 
the rental units in connection with which these charges 
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were incurred produced an income in the amount of 
$481.25 per month, or $5,775.00 per year, which income 
is far greater than the expenses incurred during the 
same period of time. Therefore, it affirmatively appearR 
that the expenses were not incurred primarily for the 
benefit of the estate, but were incurred in the produc-
tion of rental income, and that they are, therefore, not 
administrative expenses. 
II. 
Should the expenses claim·ed be taken out of rental 
income produced by reason of such expenditures? 
An old case directly in point is the Colorado ca..;~ 
of People vs. Palmer's Estate, found at 139 Pacific 55-t, 
25 Colo. app. 450, decided by the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado. In that case the court was construing the following 
statute: 
''All property, real, personal and mixed, which 
shall pass by will or by the intestate laws of thls 
state from any person who may die seised or pos-
sessed of the same while a resident of this state, 
... shall be and is, subject to a tax at the rate 
hereinafter specified to be paid to the treasurer 
of the proper county for the use of the state and 
all heirs, legatees and devisees, administrators, 
executors and trustees shall be liable for any ann 
all such taxes until the same shall have been paid 
·as hereinafter directed . . . '' 
\Vhile this statute does not provide for deduction 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
of administrative expenses, the court in discussing this 
statute said: 
''Everything bequeathed or devised passes to 
the heir, and nothing is deducted from that which 
passes, or ought to be deducted; not even the 
debts of the decedent or expenses of administra-
tion are deducted from that which passes, but in 
contemplation of the law, before the passin.~ 
takes place, as nothing can pass until the debts 
are paid, including the debts of the estate, such 
as expenses of administration. The statute says 
that the tax is to be paid on the value of every-
thing that passes by the will or the law, and not 
on what the heir actually receives, although it 
makes no difference because the heir actually 
receives everything that is bequeathed or devised; 
nothing can be devised or bequeathed except what 
is left after the obligations of the decedent and 
expenses of administration are paid.'' 
Thus it appears that the court had in mind that 
administrative expenses should be deducted before the 
tax i~ levied even though the statute did not specifically 
~o provide. In spite of this language the court refused 
to allo\Y a deduction of $25,000 expended by the execu-
tor~ during the administration for the "upkeep" of th•3 
home of the deec-'dent and said: 
''The $25,000 item is so clearly a charge 
against the devisees expended to preserve the 
property devised to them, and which, as provided 
by the statute, vested in them and to be appraised 
of as of the time of death, that reference to it is 
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not necessary except as it may be involved in dis-
cussion of the other item.'' (Inheritance tax 
levied by a foreign state). 
While it is believed that this case goes a little far, 
it is believed that it announces the principle which should 
be controlling in this case. That is, that in this case since 
the devisee of the property, the executrix, has received 
the rent accruing on the real property since the death 
of the decedent, which rents have not been included in 
the assets of the estate, the deductions claimed herein 
should be paid by the executrix from the rental income 
received from the property. 
Section 101-3-9, Utah Code Annotated 1943, prL>-
vides: 
"In a specific devise or legacy the title passes 
by the will, but possession can only be obtained 
from the personal representative; and he may be 
authorized by the court to sell the property d£:-
vised and bequeathed in the cases herein pro-
vided.'' 
Thus the real property in this case passed to tlw 
devisee immediately following the death of the decedent 
and she was entitled to the property, and the income of 
the property, subject to any control the probate court 
might assert over the property. 
In this regard the following is found in 32 Am. Jur., 
Landlord and Tenant, Section 448, Page 364: 
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''As a general rule, since rent to accrue is an 
incident of the reversion, upon the death of a 
lessor, who had reserved rent g-enerally for the 
duration of the term, rents thereafter to accrue 
and to become payable either in money or in a 
share of the crops raised upon the premises do 
not devolve upon his executor or administrator 
for administration as a part of his personal estate, 
but descend at once, with the reversion, as real 
estate, to his heirs at law, or pass to the devisees 
who are entitled under his will to the reversion, 
unless otherwise disposed of by will ... However, 
the right of an heir or devisee to future rent, as 
an incident of the reversion, is subject to charges 
upon the premises, to the payment of taxes upon 
the property, even though they were assessed 
prior to his acquisition of title, to homestead 
rights, and to whatever claim the surviving spouse 
of the lessor can assert in the premises by way 
of a right to dower or to a statutory distributive 
share in his estate. :Moreover, as hereinafter 
stated, the rule which awards future rents to the 
heir or devisee of the lessor has been modified by 
Rtatutes which permit the personal representative 
to take the rents unconditionally as in some juris-
dictions, and for the payment of debts or for 
other specified purpose in other jurisdictions, and 
by statutes which provide for the sale of the real 
estate left by a decedent, in order to pay his 
debts ... " 
''It appears that a personal representative in 
accounting for rents collected by him as an agent 
for the heirs or devisees should be allowed a 
credit for payrnents made by him for taxes, in-
surance pre1niun1s, interest on encumbrances, and 
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expenses of repairs, and that he should be en-
titled to retain :a reasonable amount for his own 
compensation in looking after the rents and the 
premises, at least where he acted in these respects 
with the knowledge and consent of the heirs or 
devisees.'' 
At 31 A. L. R., Page 27, appears an annotation of 
\he various states as to who is entitled to rent accruing 
after the death of the landlord, and in all 23 jurisdictions 
cited the cases hold that in the absence of a provision 
in the will to the contrary the devisees under the will 
are entitled to receive the rents of the estate subject to 
any debts against the estate at the time of the death 
of the devisor. 
The question as to what expenses should be taken 
from the corpus of an estate and what expenses should 
be taken from the income of an estate has arisen in 
many cases involving a dispute between those persons 
entitled to the principal of the estate and those entitled 
to the income of an estate. The case of Commercial Xa-
tional Bank of Charlotte vs. Charles A. Misenheimer 
and J. J. Misenheimer, appearing at 110 A. L. R. 1310 
was an action brought by the executor for a con~truc­
tion and interpretation of the will of the testator. At 
the time of his death the testator owned four tracts of 
land as a tenant in common with Charles A. ~~ i~en­
heimer, one of the defendants. It appeared that the 
testator left personal property sufficient to pay all per-
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sonal debts exclusive of those secured by deeds of trust 
on the real property. The lower court had made an order 
authorizing the executor, among other things, to collect 
one-half of the rents from the devised real estate, to 
keep a separate account, and to pay therefrom the pro 
rata share of the testator's estate for repairs, taxes, 
insurance, and interest on the mortgage indebtedness. 
The Supreme Court, in ruling on this question said: 
"While ordinary rents collected by the execu-
tor from the devised property would go to the 
devisee, the order from Harding, J ., authorizing 
the application of collection of rents to repairs, 
taxes, insurance and mortgage indebtedness on 
the particular tracts from which the rents were 
derived, would not be injurious to the interest 
of the appellant and his exception to the order is 
without substantial merit.'' 
In the case of Spring vs. Hollander, a Massachu-
setts case found at 158 N. E. 791, which involved a peti-· 
tion 1,)- a trustee appointed by the probate court to sell 
the lands of an estate, the question arose whether the 
taxes on the realty should be paid by th.e life tenant or 
should be deducted from the selling price of the land 
before the principal should be paid to the residuary 
legatee. The court decided that the ordinary taxes on 
the realty are to be paid by the life tenant and in doing 
so quoted the following from Wiggin vs. Swett, 6 :Mete 
194, at Page 201 (39 Amdec 716): 
"Taxes are properly payable out of the rent 
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and income of real estate and therefore constitut~ 
a proper charge upon those who have the actual 
and beneficial use and enjoyment of the estate 
for the time being, whether it be in fee, for life, 
or for years.'' 
In the case of Mahoney vs. Kearins, a Massachusett~ 
case found at 184 N. E. 686, which arose upon a petition 
of the trustee for instructions as to what funds should 
be used to pay the taxes on real estate in which a life 
estate was devised to the daughters of the deceased, the 
following appears: 
"In the first case under paragraph 13 of the 
will the trustee is directed to hold the premises 
described therein in trust for the benefit of cer-
tain named daughters, 'with power on the part 
of my said daughters to occupy said homestead, 
according to the requirements set forth in para-
graph 20 of this will'. It is plain that under thi:; 
power the daughters named were given a benefi-
cial interest in the homestead analogous to an 
equitable life estate. Assuming that power wn~ 
exercised by any one of the daughters and that 
such an election created an equitable life e:-;tate 
in the ·donee, the rule is applicable, unless thr 
will directs otherwise, that taxes, insurance, re-
pairs and all incidental expenses of the ordinary 
maintenance of real estate held in the trust shall 
be borne by the life tenant. Taxes (insurance and 
repairs) are properly payable out of the rent and 
income of real estate, and therefore constitute r. 
proper charge upon those who had the actual and 
beneficial use and enjoyment of the estate for 
the time being.'' 
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In re Jacob's Estate, 2 N. Y. S. 2d, 973, the decedent 
had bequeathed a sum of $3,000.00 to her executors in 
trust to be expended for a college course for her grand-
daughter with the provision that in the event that said 
granddaughter refused or was unable to pursue such 
course before she arrived at the age of 25 the $3,000.00 
was to be paid to someone other than the granddaughter. 
The court of appeals had directed that the income from 
said trust fund be paid to the granddaughter, Ruth 
Jacobs, until she became 25 years of age, and that in the 
event she failed to qualify and take the principal sum, 
said sum of $3,000.00 should be paid to Clara Augusta 
Traver. Ruth Jacobs failed to qualify and the principal 
of the trust fund belongs to the appellant. The appeal 
was taken from an order of the court assessing a tax 
upon the interest of Clara Augusta Traver without cer-
tain deductions and claims first being deducted from the 
principal sum before the net sum on which tax deducted 
from the principal sum was arrived at. Among the items 
claimed to be deducted were the trustee's commission on 
the income derived from the trust fund, the attorney 
fees and costs and disbursements in proceedings insti-
tuted by the trustee to determine the rights of Ruth 
Jacobs and Clara Augusta Traver. The court held: 
''The trustee's commission on the income de-
rived fr01n the trust fund is not deductible . . . 
The allowances for attorney's fees to Ruth Jacobs 
and William H. Jacobs of $271.19, to Clara Au-
gusta Traver of $136.96, and to the special guard-
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ian of $403.45, are clearly not deductible, as these 
are personal expenditures by the beneficiaries of 
the sums sought to be deducted for the benefit of 
their respective estates." 
In discussing the matter of attorney fees the court 
said: 
''However, in this case the proceedings were 
instituted by the trustee appointed under the 
eighth paragraph of the will of the decedent and 
did not involve the whole estate of the testatrix 
but simply the rights of Ruth Jacobs and the 
appellant, Clara Augusta Traver, to the trust fund 
thereby bequeathed. The expenditures made by 
the trustee were for the benefit of these two 
beneficiaries alone and did not involve the whoJe 
estate. Under these circumstances these sums art! 
not deductible . . . 
" ... It may be stated as a general rule that 
expenses of litigation in conserving and preserv-
ing the corpus of the estate are proper deductions 
before the assessment of the tax; but the expenses 
of litigation by the distributees over their respec-
tive interests, which does not in any manner affert 
the size of the amount of the estate originally 
passing, should not be so deducted.'' 
It is submitted that in the case at bar the real prop-
erty of the decedent passed to the devisee, who in this 
case is also the executrix, immediately upon the death 
of the decedent subject to the payment of any expenses 
of the estate or claims against the estate in the event 
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the other assets of the estate were not sufficient to take 
care of these expenses or claims; that immediately upon 
the death of the decedent the devisee became entitled to 
the income produced by the rental property in question 
after the death of the decedent, subject to the limita-
tions already mentioned; that since the devisee was 
entitled to the income of the rental property, that is, the 
beneficial use, she should pay the costs of repairs, insur-
ance, taxes, and other incidental expenses of the ordi-
nary maintenance of real estate. That the deductions 
claimed herein fall within that classification and should, 
therefore, be paid out of the income. That since the de-
ductions claimed herein should have been paid out of 
the income produced by the rental property, they should 
not be deducted from the corpus of the estate, especially 
since none of the income derived has been included in 
the corpus of the estate upon which the tax in question 
is levied. 
III. 
Are the claimed deductions debts owing by the dece-
dent at the time of his death? 
Although it does not appear from the evidence that 
there were any rent agreements or leases, except on a 
month to month basis, in effect at the time of the de-
ce(lent ':-; death, which had not yet expired, even assum-
ing this to be the case, it is submitted that any such 
leases do not constitute an obligation which falls withiu 
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the definition of a debt owing by the decedent at the 
time of his death for two reasons. First, the leases, if 
any, cease to he an obligation of the estate and becom~~ 
the obligation of the devisee of the real proper~y, and 
second, the obligation is not a debt. 
"In the absence of a covenant otherwise pro-
viding, as a general rule a lease is not terminated 
by the death of the lessor or the lessee. The rule 
may be altered, however, by st~.tute and the terms 
of the lease may be such as to terminate it on the 
death of the lessor ... " 51 C. J. S., Section 92, 
Page 659. 
''On the death of the landlord, his tenant con-
tinues in the same relation to those who are b)· 
law entitled to succeed to the rights of the de-
cedent until his disclaimer of such relation is 
made known to them, although, where one entitled 
to a part interest has leased the entire estate, a 
person who at the lessors death becomes entitled 
to the entire estate may hold the lessee as his 
tenant only as to the part interest to which the 
lessor was entitled." 51 C. J. S., Section 22d, 
Page 527. 
In the case of Dobbelaar vs. Hughes, a New J erse~· 
case decided at 156 Atlantic 469, an action to quiet title 
brought by a tenant against the heirs and devisees of 
the decedent, it was held that the tenant, by remaining 
in possession of the premises after the death of the 
intestate landlord became the heir's tenant by operation 
of law. 
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In the case of ~fain Ys. Norman, 36 Atl. 2d 256, it 
was held that a land owner could not maintain an action 
against a deceased adjoining owner's estate for damage;; 
for failure to erect and maintain one-half of a division 
fence where plaintiff admitted that the fence was in 
good order at the tin1e of the adjoining owner's death 
and claimed that losses resulting to him occurred after-
wards from losses of sheep and loss of use of land since 
neither loss could afford basis of claim against the estate 
or suit against administrator as such. 
The following definition of debt is taken from Hodg-
son vs. :Jiarks, 300 N. Y. S. 661, 664; 165 Misc. 680: 
"The word 'debt' comes from the Latin 'de-
here', meaning to owe; 'debitum' meaning some-
thing owed. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's 
third rev.) at page 786, defines it as a sum of 
money due by certain and express agreement; all 
that is due a man under any form of obligation 
or promise.'' 
''The distinguishing ·and necessary feature of 
a debt is that a fixed and specific amount is owing, 
and no future valuation is required to settle it.'' 
In the case of Eckenrock's Will, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 582; 
Hi7 l\Iisc. 632, the issue was as follows: At the date of 
his death, which occurred August 6, 1934, the decedent 
was the owner of certain real property at 97 Warwick 
Street, Brooklyn. Taxes against this property had been 
levied and finally determined for the year 1934 in the 
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payable on April 1, 1934, and the latter sum on October 
1, 1934. The widow, to whom the property was devised, 
paid the sum which fell due on October 1st, presented a 
claim therefore to the executors, and objects to their 
accounts by reason of its rejection. The court held that 
an installment of a real estate tax which did not become 
a debt until the date when it became due and payable 
was not a "debt" of decedent who died subsequent to 
the levy but prior to the date on which the installment 
was due, and hence executors were not required to re-
imburse devisee of property who paid installment when 
it fell due. 
We may conclude from the foregoing that upon the 
death of the testator in this case the devisee stepped into 
his shoes as landlord and that thereafter the relation-
ship of landlord and tenant ceased to exist between any 
lessre -of the property and the decedent. Since there does 
not appear to have been any viol~ation of any rental 
agreement prior to the decedent's death, and since the 
deductions claimed herein arose in the performance of 
leases after the decedent's death, when he had ceased to 
be the landlord, the claimed deductions were not ''debts 
of the decedent owing at the time of his death.'' 
CONCLUSION 
It appears, therefore, that the deductions claimed 
herein should not have been allowed for the reason that 
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they do not fall within the definitions of any deductions 
which may be allowed ~nder Section 80-12-7 or 80-12-8, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943. They are not administrative 
expenses incurred for the preservation of the estate for 
the reason that they do not meet the primary test for 
preservation expenses. That is, they were not incurred 
in good faith for the benefit of the estate, but rather were 
incurred for the benefit of the devisee under the will in 
producing rental income, to which, as we have seen, 
the devisee was entitled, and performing the devisee's 
obligations as landlord to the tenants of the real prop-
erty. Moreover, since the rental income during the time 
in which the expenses were incurred is more than suffi-
cient to pay the expenses of the real property on which 
the rental income is received, the devisee, receiving the 
benefit of the income, should pay the expenses of pro-
ducing the income. 
Finally, it appears that the obligation of the land-
lord to the tenants passed to the devisee, by reason of 
the devisee's accepting the benefits of such relationships, 
and thereby became the obligation of the devisee. That 
the executor in furnishing the services for which the 
deductions are claimed, was not discharging any obli-
gation of the decedent, but the obligation of the devisee. 
And furthermore, that any obligation of the decedent to 
the tenant existing at the time of his death was not a 
debt due upon the death of the decedent as defined by 
the statutes for the reason that there was nothing owing. 
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There was not even a claim against the decedent at the 
time of his death by any tenant for the reason that he 
had not failed to perform any part of his obligation 
prior to his death, and therefore, there is no cause of 
action existing against him at the time of his death. 
Even were this true, any such claim has not been adjudi-
cated or reduced to an amount certain as the l~aw seems 
to require. 
It is therefore the contention of the appellant herein 
that the court erred in allowing the deductions herein 
set out before arriving at the amount on which the in-
heritance tax was charged. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUB-
MITTED that the judgment of the lower court should 
be reversed and the case remanded ·with directions to 
disallow the deductions claimed by the executrix and 
disputed by the Tax Commission. 
Respectfully submitted, 
G. I-IAL TAYLOR 
DON J. HANSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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